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10 November 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : Implications of Molotov's "Blasé" at Geneva on German Unity

1. We do not regard Molotov's blunt reiteration of the well-known Soviet stand on German reunification as inconsistent with the new Soviet "peaceful" line. Soviets have long made it amply clear that though they seek a reduction of tensions, it is not to be at the price of any change in the status quo in Germany, except on their own terms.

2. The sharpness of Molotov's statement of the Soviet position was probably due to two considerations: (a) He had been losing on points under the pressure of the Western ministers in previous sessions. It is the usual Soviet practice to strike back hard with bullying tactics. This must also be regarded by them as necessary to sustain the position of the GDR; (b) One of the principal Soviet aims at this time is to demonstrate to the West Germans that Four-Power negotiations are not the road to unity. The USSR hopes that a hard line will drive home to the West Germans that there is no effective "position of strength" in their association with NATO. This is calculated to allow West

German rearmament and ultimately to make the West Germans ripe for direct dealings with the Soviets and the GDR.

3. There is thus far no sign in the working level meetings that the USSR will prove any more conciliatory on the other agenda items than it has on Germany. Nevertheless, we still believe that the Soviets probably do not wish to have the meeting end in complete frustration. In order to make some pretense of keeping the spirit of Geneva alive, they may therefore make some marginal concessions to Western views on disarmament and on East-West contacts. These would almost certainly be more apparent than real, however.

4. We do not believe that Molotov's position on the German issue would be repudiated by his colleagues in Moscow, nor that his behavior at the conference is in any way related to possible weakness of his position at home. Molotov is almost certainly in tune with his colleagues on this issue; it was Khrushchev himself who recently told Lester Pearson that the Soviets would rather have two-thirds of Germany against them than the whole of it. Molotov may be retired after Geneva if it suits Soviet purpose to use him as a scapegoat, but it almost certainly will not be because of his stand on Germany. The fact that Molotov made his November 8th speech just after he returned from Moscow shows that he must have cleared it with the Presidium.

SHERMAN KENT
Assistant Director
National Estimates